This paper investigates wage and employment determination by a group of workers or union and a …rm, making use of the techniques of non-cooperative bargaining. Previous analyses have examined wage determination with an arti…cial restriction that employment is determined either before or after wage determination has occurred. Here, employment determination is made part of the bargaining process. With two variables being determined, there is bargaining with a variable pie and solutions correspond to equilibria without commitment. Two di¤erent notions of e¢ ciency -exchange and pie e¢ ciency -are relevant and serve to characterise equilibria. Multiple equilibria are shown to arise naturally once exchange ine¢ cient proposals are possible. In all equilibria there is overemployment. Factors which restrict a …rm's ability to alter the labour force during or after the wage bargaining process are shown, paradoxically, to bene…t the …rm.
Introduction
Many models of bargaining between workers and …rm have been presented and such models provide the standard paradigm for wage and employment determination at the microeconomic level. However, it is a commonplace to employ assumptions which should, in a fully satisfactory microfoundation set-up, appear as an implication of the bargaining process. A non-cooperative bargaining approach is not free from ad hoc elements, but it has the principal advantage that the bargaining process with o¤ers and counter-o¤ers appear explicitly and these are based upon a rational assessment of the bargaining process in operation.
In the model of this paper, o¤ers are made sequentially, rationality being captured by restricting attention to subgame perfect equilibria. In this way, the analysis closely follows Rubinstein (1982) , which itself when applied to workers-…rm bargaining is in the spirit of Zeuthen (1930) and Hicks (1932) . But unlike Rubinstein, it is assumed that instead of there being a homogeneous 'pie'to be divided, both bargaining parties are interested in two variables, the wage and level of employment. With two variables, it is possible for outcomes, or proposed outcomes, to be exchange ine¢ cient -there is another wage/employment pair that would make both parties better o¤. Several authors, notably Leontie¤ (1946) and, more recently, McDonald and Solow (1981) have suggested that attention should be restricted to exchange e¢ cient bargaining outcomes. It will be shown that whilst exchange e¢ ciency plays an important role is classifying the set of possible equilibrium outcomes, equilibria will in general be exchange ine¢ cient and, in particular, will be characterised by over-employment. The existence of exchange ine¢ cient outcomes also admits the possibility of a delay in agreement which is costly to both parties. Fernandez and Glazer (1990) have exhibited a model where delay can occur in equilibrium though in that model, it is the form of the sequential structure of bargaining which gives rise to delay (see also Haller and Holden (1990) ). These papers examine non-cooperative bargaining but assume a homogenous 'pie'. With the possibility of delay, a range of equilibria become possible.
Following a tradition that can be traced back to the monopoly union model of Dunlop (1944) , it is assumed that a …rm has direct control over the level of employment -the …rm has a right-to-manage. In the Dunlop model the workers, who are formed into a union, act as a Stakelberg leader and choose the wage taking into consideration the fact that the …rm will choose employment in response to this. Given the restriction to a two-stage procedure, the …rm will choose an employment level on the labour demand curve. But an unsatisfactory feature of the Dunlop model is that it is implicitly assumed that wage bargaining cannot reopen after employment has been determined.
A similar criticism can be made of the literature on union-…rm bargaining, e.g. Holden (1989) , where it is assumed that employment is determined prior to wage bargaining.
Here, the right-to-manage is made part of the bargaining process -during bargaining, the …rm can change the labour force and this is recognised by workers.
The problem analyzed in this paper can be construed as one where contracts stay in force for a short time or, in the limit, the union and the …rm are free to renegotiate contracts at any time. (In practice, because the underlying economic environment is stationary, no renegotiation occurs once agreement is reached). The monopoly union model, say, is based upon the notion that when the …rm changes the labour force, there is no renegotiation of contracts -the model ignores the fact that contracts are of …nite duration and that the contract that will be chosen in the future will be in ‡uenced by the labour force now being chosen by the …rm. In the present model, each party agrees to the contract that is determined through bargaining. The …rm, for instance, will not wish to alter the labour force after agreement is reached because it realises that the contract that will then be negotiated starting at the changed labour force will be inferior. With an annual round of wage negotiation, any reasonable discount rate leads both parties to give overriding consideration to the in ‡uence of the present contract on future contracts negotiated and this e¤ect is highlighted in the present model.
Workers are assumed to be represented by a single entity -a union. With the union sensitive to the preferences of its present members, its objective will depend upon the current labour force. For the present analysis, the importance of this feature is that the employment level determines both pay-o¤s and the future preferences of one of the parties to the bargain. Under a right-to-manage assumption, the …rm can choose, in part, the preferences of the agent with which it is bargaining and, to discourage the …rm from changing employment, the union can make a wage demand that gives to the …rm at least as much as it knows it could get from bargaining with the union of any di¤erent composition. The value of being in a position to bargain with an agent with di¤erent preferences acts like an outside option Sutton (1984b), Sutton (1986) ) available to the …rm when it is bargaining with the union of some particular composition. This is a central aspect of the analysis.
It is clear from the above discussion that the present analysis follows the standard literature and treats the union as a single party to the bargaining process. Thus this paper deals with a two party bargaining process and ignores the fact that many individuals, the workers, are involved in the bargain. Interesting issues concerned with the formation of unions cannot be properly addressed within this framework and require an explicit multi-party setting (see Horn and Wolinsky (1988) ).
The paper is organised as follows. The basic model is set down in the next section and, in section 3, the notion of an e¢ cient agreement is examined. The idea of exchange e¢ ciency, where it is impossible to make both parties better o¤, has been alluded to above. To interpret the equilibria that can arise under bargaining, it is useful to introduce the idea of pie e¢ ciency. In the Rubinstein framework the parties bargain over a 'pie' which is that entity that is shrinking when there is a delay in reaching agreement. A pie e¢ cient outcome involves the maximisation of that entity which is shrinking through delay. The main equilibrium characterisation results are presented in section 4 (proofs are relegated to the appendix) and implications of the results are drawn out in section 5. Concluding remarks are contained in section 6.
The Model
We consider a single union and single …rm who bargain with each other. The variables to be determined are the wage to be paid -all workers receive the same wage -and the size of the labour force. Figure 1 describes a round of bargaining. The …rm …rst determines the number of its present labour force to …re and the number of recruits to hire. It is assumed that there is a large set of workers who are willing, subject to a reservation wage constraint, to work for the …rm; these workers have identical preferences and identical outside opportunities. Because there is a large potential workforce, those …red from the labour force never expect to return to the …rm. The hiring and …ring possibility makes possible a strategy where the …rm gives up negotiating with its present labour force and, instead, negotiates with another group of workers.
Once a new labour force has been determined, the …rm makes a wage o¤er which, if accepted by the union, is implemented. If it is rejected there is a delay of unity before the union can make a wage demand. If this is accepted by the …rm then the solution is implemented. If it is rejected then, after a delay of unity, a new round of bargaining begins.
The important aspect of the bargaining process is the incorporation of the …rm's right-to-manage. This, it could be expected, will limit the power of insider workers as compared to outsiders. Looking at Figure 1 , a union wage demand is placed immediately before the stage where the …rm can change the labour force. If it was the …rm that made a wage o¤er at this stage then the …rm could, in essence, give an ultimatum to the present labour force with no counter-o¤er from the labour force being possible.
The sequential structure of Figure 1 is a simple way of expressing the idea that wage o¤ers and demands are 'cheap'-an alternative set-up would allow the other side to always respond with a counter-o¤er before changes in the labour force could occur.
This set-up produces equilibria similar to those that follow from the sequential structure of Figure 1 and if counter-o¤ers are made at some cost and rejected counter-o¤ers do not in ‡uence future behaviour -a Markovian assumption -then the similarity is complete.
In Figure 1 it is assumed that the time between changes in the labour force and the …rm's wage o¤er, is zero. The reason for this is to ensure that minimal changes are made to the Rubinstein (1982) alternating o¤ers bargaining game. In particular, if the right-to-manage assumption is removed and no change in the labour force is permitted, the problem reduces to the Rubinstein model. The ability to change the labour force means the size of the 'pie'to be divided is under the control of one of the bargaining parties -the …rm.
We now look at the preferences of the two bargaining parties. It is assumed that bargaining delays the receipt of a surplus which comes from the …rm and workers acting together. We deal with the …rm's preferences …rst as these are straightforward.
Net of payment for factors other than labour, the …rm is assumed to have a volume of surplus product given by f (`) t where f is the volume of output and is a discount factor (it is assumed that 0 < < 1) and t is the time taken to reach agreement.
Because of the existence of other factors, f may decline for`large. Given a payment of w to workers when agreement is reached, the present value of pro…ts evaluated at date 0 is given by
This is taken to be the …rm's valuation function. Notice that during the course of bargaining, the time to agreement diminishes and the present value of pro…t increases but there is no change in the relative evaluation of di¤erent possible outcomes.
Turning to the union, we start by looking at the preferences of workers. A worker involved in bargaining for t periods before agreement is reached is assumed to obtain present value utility given by
The utility function v is assumed to be continuous, strictly increasing and concave with v(0) = 0. The wage in (4) may be viewed as the present value of wage payments and , the discount factor, is assumed to be the same as the …rm's discount factor. When w is equal to r, the worker is indi¤erent about further delay in reaching agreement; r is a temporary reservation wage which may be viewed either as the value of leisure or as the wage received whilst negotiations take place.
If the worker is …red after s periods of negotiation then utility is given by
The parameter b w may be viewed as the permanent reservation wage in the sense that it is the wage available if …red (or if the worker decides to quit). Thus the outside option available to workers is v( b w r) and potential workers will be available to the …rm if and only if the prospects with the …rm give a return of at least v( b w r).
Applying the outside option principle (Shaked and Sutton (1984b) ), bargaining will be una¤ected by the outside option so long as wage o¤ers and demands exceed the option. To concentrate on other issues, this is assumed always to be the case.
Let V t be the expected utility of a representative member of the labour force at date t, discounted back to t. If f t and h t is the number …red and hired at t (these will be zero at t odd) then the labour force`t +1 will be given bỳ
Using (2) and (3), V t will satisfy
if agreement is not reached at date t: If agreement is reached at date t then
An implication of (5) is that all members of the …rm's labour force at any point during negotiations have identical preferences concerning future negotiations and agreements.
Given a democratic union that acts in the interest of its members -and membership being equated with the …rm's current labour force -the union's objective becomes the expected utility of a representative member at each date. This will be the assumed objective of the union.
One feature of the union's preferences deserves emphasis. These depend upon the wage and employment level eventually agreed upon and the time taken to reach agreement. But the union's preferences are a function of that proportion of its current labour force that are eventually employed and this means that the path taken to reach agreement is important. One way of seeing this is to consider the evaluation of agreements that will be reached after one more period of delay and with minimal disruption to the labour force (no hiring or no …ring). If the initial force is b then combining (5a) and (5b) gives
Thus, even in a simple world without both hiring and …ring during negotiations, the preferences of the union will depend upon the current labour force. An important aspect of the present analysis is the …rm's ability to choose, in part, the preferences of the union with which it negotiates. For instance, the choice of a high labour force could encourage workers to settle quickly because widespread …ring will take place when the …rm next chooses the labour force. The …rm will recognise this and this will help determine the labour force choice by the …rm.
E¢ cient Agreements
As a prelude to the analysis of equilibria in the bargaining model, we will start by looking at the notion of e¢ cient agreements. With bargaining models incorporating variable 'pie'size, it turns out that there are two di¤erent notions of e¢ ciency which may con ‡ict.
The most compelling notion of e¢ ciency comes from the idea that at an outcome, it should not be possible to make both parties better-o¤. Setting t = 0 in (1) and = 1 in (6) The bargaining model under consideration collapses to the original Rubinstein model when the labour force composition cannot be altered. In that model, there is a unique equilibrium outcome which involves an appropriate division (depending upon discount factors) of some 'pie'. An alternative notion of e¢ ciency for a bargaining problem relates to seeking conditions under which the size of the 'pie'is maximised.
Assume that the labour force is restricted to be of size`. Then starting at the second round of negotiations, the …rm will ask for some pro…t (`) which is unique (see Rubinstein (1982) and Shaked and Sutton (l984a) ). If employment is …xed then at date 1 of the …rst round of negotiations, workers will prefer an outcome which o¤ers the …rm (`) -an o¤er that the …rm is willing to accept and gives a higher wage to the workers than they would get from the outcome negotiated, starting at round 2.
This wage will be w = (f (`) (`))=`. However, at date 0, the …rm only need o¤er a wage payment of w 0 where v(w 0 r) = v(w r) (see (2)) and this gives a pro…t to the …rm which, from the uniqueness of (`) must equal (`):
This can be solved explicitly for (`) when v is speci…ed. For instance, let v(w) = w so (7) solves to give:
Corresponding to (8) the wage bill will be given by:
Equation (8) expresses a sharing rule. The term f (`) r`is the 'pie'which is being shared (it is what is being eroded away whilst negotiations proceed). When ! 1;
the second term tends to 1 1+
; when = 1, the second term is 1 1+
. If = 1 and ! 1 then the second term is one-half; this is the well-known equal sharing rule from Rubinstein (1982) .
If the …rm could commit itself to a particular labour force at the outset of bargaining then it would choose`equal to that which maximises (`) in (7): with an iso-elastic utility function:
Labour compositions with a larger pie will be termed more pie e¢ cient and full e¢ ciency will result from a maximised pie, e.g. from a size`given by (10). This is shown in Figure 2 . When the utility function fails to be iso-elastic,`given by (10) will only approximate the pie e¢ cient solution derived from (7).
As Figure 2 makes clear, exchange e¢ ciency di¤ers from pie e¢ ciency. The standard criticism of bargaining solutions that are on the labour demand curve is that they fail to be exchange e¢ cient. 3 But if the …rm chooses the labour force at the commencement of bargaining and is then committed to it then pie e¢ ciency is relevant and the outcome may fail to be exchange e¢ cient. The idea that bargaining models can be laid down which lead to pie e¢ cient solutions is implicit in, for instance, Holden (1989) .
To simplify the notation in the next section, it is useful to be able to express equations like (7) neatly. De…ne:
so that (7) becomes:
The solution to (12) is written as R (`) to denote the fact that it is the division that will arise in a Rubinstein bargaining problem with`…xed. Under concavity of v( ), the function g is increasing in but with a slope strictly less than unity; as g(0;`) > 0 when v is de…ned (f (`) r`> 0); there is a unique solution to (12). Finally it is useful to be able to express the commitment bargaining solution diagrammatically.
As w`= f (`) (`); (12) can be used to trace out this solution in (w;`) space. This is shown in Figure 3 and labelled RR.
The union's preferences depend upon the current level of the labour force. It is worth noting that preferences are conservative in the sense that preferences favour the current labour force -if (w 1 ;`1) is weakly preferred to (w 2 ;`2) starting at`2 then this will be the ranking starting at`1: This explains why the set of exchange e¢ cient outcomes is potentially large. Finally, it is necessary to draw attention to one other aspect of preferences as this will be used in the proof of Proposition 5 below. Taking any iso-pro…t curve, the union is made strictly worse o¤ as one moves away from the set of points that are exchange e¢ cient. In particular, if`0 is exchange e¢ cient then, starting at`which is exchange ine¢ cient, the union prefers to move to`0. With an obvious change in notation:
If union preferences were not a function of the existing labour force then this would be implied by the de…nition of exchange e¢ ciency.
Negotiation Equilibria
The purpose of this section is to characterize the subgame perfect equilibria of the bargaining model and, in particular, to examine the relationship between equilibria and e¢ ciency. We start by looking at models with elements of commitment and then turn to the non-commitment case.
Equilibria with Commitment
We look at two cases. First, we recall from the last section what happens if the …rm …rst chooses a labour force to which it is then committed. As the problem then reduces to a Rubinstein bargaining problem, there is a unique equilibrium:
Proposition 1 If the …rm commits to a labour force at the outset then the …rm chooses a pie e¢ cient labour force and division of the pie is as in the Rubinstein problem.
For comparison purposes, it is useful to consider the other polar case where the parties can commit to the wage bargain and the …rm chooses the labour force after the wage has been agreed. This underlies the Dunlop solution and corresponds to a real world situation where wage contracts remain in force for long periods of time. Because agreement to a wage does not bind the …rm with regard to employment, an optimal strategy for the …rm is, in the event that the bargained wage exceeds b w, to …re all workers and hire a new labour force, the size of which is determined by the competitive labour demand at the bargained wage rate. Without hiring and …ring costs, this is a credible strategy which leads to a bargained wage of b w. But with an in…nitesimally small hiring or …ring cost, this strategy is no longer credible -the new labour force will behave just like the replaced labour force -and, after the wage is agreed, the …rm will move to a point on the labour demand curve with minimal hiring and …ring, i.e.
either no hiring or no …ring. During the bargaining process, the union and …rm will, in essence, make proposals along the labour demand curve and the model becomes a direct extension of the monopoly union model where both sides can make wage o¤ers.
The outcome to this wage bargaining game can be brie ‡y outlined. If the initial union size is small, or if the initial size is large and the labour demand curve is su¢ ciently inelastic, then the union will strictly prefer outcomes which are further up the labour demand curve and which correspond to a higher wage. The …rm's preferences will be exactly the opposite. Given that preferences have this strictly competitive property, the bargaining game is a mild extension of that which led to equation (7), with the labour force size varying with proposed wage/pro…t changes.
If the best the …rm can achieve when it makes an o¤er is pro…ts of 0 (with implied wage w 0 and labour force size of`0 given from the labour demand curve) then, at the previous stage of bargaining, the worst the union can achieve when it makes an o¤er gives pro…t to the …rm of 00 = 0 (with implied wage w 00 and labour force`0 0 ). But looking one further stage back, the best the …rm can achieve must involve a wage payment of w 000 where v(w 000 r) = v(w 00 r) and w 000 must equal w 0 by de…nition.
Although it is easy to write down characterizing equations in the general case, the case of close to unity is of particular interest. Then`0 is close to`0 0 and as f (`) w1
is maximized on the labour demand curve, an envelope condition ensures that the wage/pro…t opportunities at`0 and`0 0 are the same whether the labour force is …xed or whether there is movement along the labour demand curve. In consequence, the bargained outcome must therefore be on the RR curve. An exactly similar argument applies to the worst equilibrium for the …rm. We thus have Proposition 2 Assume that there are (small) hiring or …ring costs and that there is almost no discounting ( ! 1). If the …rm can choose the labour force after wage bargaining and bargaining takes place with a union of small size then the best and worst outcome for the …rm will occur on the labour demand curve with division as in the Rubinstein problem -the intersection of the labour demand curve and the RR curve in Figure 3 . If this intersection is unique then the outcome is unique.
Comparing this to Proposition 1, the …rm prefers a situation where it must commit to a labour force before wage bargaining to a situation where it has the freedom to change the labour force after wage bargaining. Furthermore, whereas Proposition 1 suggests that the bargained outcome will involve overemployment as measured by exchange e¢ ciency, with employment determination occurring after wage bargaining, the outcome is exchange e¢ cient but borders on underemployment outcomes.
If the initial union size is large then the neatness of Proposition 2 is lost and, without specifying the form of the function v, it is not possible to usefully characterize the bargained outcome other than to say that it will be on the labour demand curve between the competitive outcome and the outcome given in Proposition 2. However, the qualitative comparison between the outcome and that of Proposition 1 is una¤ected.
Equilibria without Commitment
We now look at the case without commitment. Here, there is no reason to believe that there will be a unique equilibrium. Before proceeding to the general case, let us look at Markov equilibria where strategies depend only on the current labour force.
5
If m (`) is the (discounted) pro…t that a …rm will receive in some equilibrium when it has just chosen labour force`then it will always choose from those labour forces that maximise m (`) giving the …rm some pro…t m : Let the set of equilibrium labour force sizes be E. Take any`2 E and, starting with`, consider the outcome ( m ;`);
`2 E; that the union most prefers. As union preferences are conservative, ( m ;`) is the best outcome for the union starting at`. What happens starting at`? At t = 1, the union will wish to make an acceptable o¤er to the …rm (of m ) and given this, we know that:
Assume that`is not pie e¢ cient and consider the consequences of the …rm choosing a labour force`0where`0 is close to`but more pie e¢ cient. At`, the union strictly prefers to make an acceptable o¤er at t = 1 (as is non-zero) so, as preferences are continuous, the union with composition`0 will wish to make an acceptable o¤er at t = 1 and the …rm will obtain pro…ts at t = 0 given by:
As`0 is more pie e¢ cient than`we have, R (`0) > m and, as g has a slope of less (15):
which is a contradiction. We therefore have
Proposition 3
In the no commitment case, Markov equilibrium involves the …rm choosing a pie e¢ cient labour force and division being determined as in the Rubinstein problem. (The size of the labour force, pro…ts and wages are uniquely determined).
Proposition 3 is a characterization result concerning the equilibrium consequences that follow, starting from the position where the …rm chooses the labour force (at t = 0). If the …rm is in negotiation with some arbitrary labour force è ; and then will move to b at t = 2 (with pro…ts m evaluated at t = 2) then, at t = 1, the union may wish to wait for the change in labour force. There is a potential for this if is su¢ ciently close to unity and the union with composition è prefers an outcome with pro…t m and labour composition b to the same pro…ts but composition è . This requires ( m ; è ) to be exchange ine¢ cient compared to ( m ; b ) . When this delay situation does not arise, the …rm attains pro…ts at t = 0 given by g( m ; è ):
We now turn to the problem of characterising the class of all subgame perfect equilibria. As is well known, as soon as the set of equilibria is non-unique, di¤erent continuations can be used to 'bootstrap'a potentially large class of equilibria. Fernandez and Glazer (1990) have noted that in a model which is a minor amendment of the Rubinstein model, it is possible to have multiple equilibria, some with ine¢ cient delay (see also Haller and Holden (1990) ). In that model, non-uniqueness can be traced to the speci…c sequential structure of the bargaining process. Here, non-uniqueness will be shown to follow from the tension that exists between exchange and pie e¢ ciency.
Once one has good and bad equilibria, it is then easy to obtain 'exotic' behaviour (including delay), this behaviour being promoted by the carrot of a good continuation equilibrium and the stick of a poor continuation equilibrium.
Given an initial labour force`; a number of di¤erent equilibria may result. Looking across all equilibria resulting from an initial choice`let (`) and (`) be the supremum and in…mum of (discounted) pro…ts that can be received by the …rm and let be the supremum of (`) over all`and let be the supremum of (`) over all : 6 When the …rm gets to the stage where labour force composition can be changed, it can ensure itself pro…ts of but can never do better than .
We start by investigating . Agreement must be reached during the …rst round of negotiation (otherwise discounted pro…ts starting at date t = 2 will be = 2 which itself exceeds which is a supremum). But out of this equilibrium, subgame perfect continuations may involve agents making unacceptable o¤ers. Unlike in the Rubinstein problem, there are exchange e¢ ciency gains that can be achieved by waiting. The analysis of equilibria must therefore take into account this possibility.
Looking at , the argument is similar to that for Markov equilibria except that more care must be taken over the possibility that o¤ers being made will be unacceptable:
Proposition 4 The maximal pro…t that the …rm can receive in an equilibrium occurs when the labour force is chosen to ensure pie e¢ ciency and division is as in the Rubinstein problem.
Proof. See appendix.
No matter have complicated the strategies, the …rm can do better than the Markov equilibrium. Furthermore, the pro…ts that can be achieved through initial commitment to a labour force provide an upper bound on pro…ts that can be achieved in all no commitment equilibria.
Looking at Figure 3 , It is clear that the equilibrium described in Propositions 1, 3 and 4 may be exchange ine¢ cient; as is clear from the …gure, whether pie e¢ ciency and exchange e¢ ciency con ‡ict depends upon whether r is su¢ ciently below b w.
We now investigate the lower limit of the …rm's pro…ts which is attained starting with labour force` . The labour force` does not depend upon the discount factor . However` , and through this , is dependent upon . Given that the rounds of negotiation may be of short duration, the most interesting case arises when is close to unity. But the case of small is easier to deal with and we start with it. The argument giving rise to Proposition 1 applies and we have:
Proposition 5 For su¢ ciently small, the in…mal pro…t that the …rm can receive in equilibrium is equal to the supremal pro…t (the labour force is chosen to ensure pie e¢ ciency and division is as in the Rubinstein problem: pro…ts, wages and labour force size are uniquely determined in equilibrium).
Proof. See Appendix.
As falls, the RR curve shifts downwards and acceptable wage o¤ers made by the …rm will fall. Unless r exceeds b w, which appears unlikely, the outside option constraint will be met as ! 0. Although all the propositions assume this constraint does not bind, Proposition 5 will continue to be satis…ed when the constraint binds, the only change being that the outside option will dictate the division of surplus.
The case of close to unity is of greater interest:
Proposition 6 Consider the labour force size`0 that maximizes pie e¢ ciency subject to being exchange e¢ cient with pro…ts . Then as ! 1; ! R (`0) and this can be sustained by an equilibrium where the …rm chooses`0 and division is as in the Rubinstein problem.
Propositions 4 and 5 show that with su¢ ciently small, the …rm's equilibrium pro…t level is uniquely determined and the labour force is chosen for pie e¢ ciency.
If pie e¢ ciency is satis…ed at an exchange e¢ cient allocation then an implication of Proposition 6 is that pro…ts are again uniquely determined. The main interest of Proposition 6 is the light that it throws on the tension between pie and exchange e¢ ciency. There is an equilibrium at a pie e¢ cient allocation and this is the best equilibrium for the …rm. Proposition 6 and, in particular, its proof show that if the discount factor is close to unity then the worst equilibrium for the …rm must occur at an exchange e¢ cient allocation. The intuition for the result is that at any equilibrium which involves agreement being reached without further changes in the labour forceand this must be the case for the equilibrium giving in…mal pro…t to the …rm -there is a worse equilibrium involving no agreement without a change in the labour force if the equilibrium is exchange ine¢ cient. Essentially, exchange ine¢ cient potential equilibria are susceptible to a strategy of bargainers that involves a move being made to a more exchange e¢ cient equilibrium which will make both bargainers better o¤. Exchange ine¢ cient potential equilibria are susceptible to delay in agreement and as the worst equilibrium for the …rm must not be so susceptible, it must be exchange e¢ cient.
Finally the preceding argument suggests that the idea that bargaining will result in exchange e¢ cient allocations should, in non-cooperative models, be represented as the idea that as frictions of bargaining become small (the cost of delay being viewed as a friction), allocations that are more exchange e¢ cient than some equilibrium allocations also become equilibria. Notice, however, that even when ! 1, only the most pie e¢ cient of the exchange e¢ cient allocations become equilibria.
Implications
The purpose of this section is to draw out the implications for union-…rm bargaining of the propositions presented in the last section.
The model has the property that the …rm has a greater degree of control as captured by the "right to manage". How does the ability to change the labour force in ‡uence the bargaining strength of the …rm? The …rm can change the labour force and use this as a 'threat'. We can abstract from 'threats'by …rst taking the case where the …rm must commit itself to a labour force. Proposition 1 characterises the equilibrium for this case but it is clear that if the roles were reversed then the union would choose a labour force that maximises the union's perceived pie and this would lead to a preferred outcome for the union. This advantage from being able to control the labour force would be present in almost any model irrespective of whether bargaining takes place.
Turning to the 'threat'motive, the …rm has the ability during bargaining to alter both the size and composition of the labour force. This ability is a twin-edged sword.
On the one hand, it allows one to consider equilibria where workers are threatened by a continuation where there will be lay-o¤s but it also allows one to consider equilibria where, in a continuation, the …rm will 'give in'and adjust the labour force to a size preferred by the union. Propositions 1 and 4 show that the ability to change the labour force during bargaining is of no value to the …rm and, given proposition 6, it may be of strictly negative value. Proposition 2 shows that the ability to change the labour force after the termination of wage bargaining can further reduce the …rm's pro…ts. It will thus be pro…table for the …rm to take decisions prior to bargaining which constrain it in its choice of labour force during bargaining. Grout (1984) has demonstrated how …rms may be deterred from investing prior to bargaining in the knowledge that the gains from investment will be shared among the …rm and workers. The present argument suggests that, prior to bargaining, the …rm will be encouraged to invest in technologies which involve little substitutability between capital and labour or to adopt other devices which make changes in the labour force expensive. For example, the paradoxical situation of the …rm supporting a generous redundancy scheme may be observed.
The results also make clear that there is no gain from having the ability to replace workers with outsiders. None of the proofs of the propositions of the last section depend upon being able to …re and hire at the same time. The reason for this is simple though important. First, there is a delay cost involved in not reaching agreement with the present labour force. Second, if an insider is replaced by an outsider then the outsider is now an insider and there is no reason for the behaviour of the union to be changed. 7 The ine¤ectiveness of being able to replace workers with new workers is a general result that transcends the particular set-up of the present paper (see Shaked and Sutton (1984a) for the …rst presentation of this argument).
The characterisation results of the last section concentrate on the …rm's pro…t level. Referring back to Figure 3 , with union preferences as speci…ed, the pie e¢ cient outcome ( ;`) will be exchange e¢ cient as long as r is not too far below b w. If r is close to b w then pro…ts are uniquely determined. Even if this is not satis…ed, there may be little variation in pro…ts across di¤erent equilibria. For simplicity, let us concentrate upon the case where pro…ts are uniquely determined (see Figure 4) and examine other features of the equilibrium set. Assume that some structural change has occurred which triggers wage bargaining between the union and the …rm. Assume that both parties are able to make an o¤er, the …rm o¤ering …rst, before there is a change from the prevailing labour force b . This is an initial stage added to the structure described in Figure 1 . With a discount factor close to unity, there are two possible outcomes:
1. If the union is better o¤ at ( ; b ) than at ( ;`), then starting at b , agreement will be reached during the …rst round of negotiation at a pro…t close to :
2. If the union is better o¤ at ( ;`) than at ( ; b ), then starting at b , there will be a delay and agreement will not be reached until t = 2 when ( ;` ) will be attained. Figure 4 shows the set of potential equilibria that can be achieved with appropriate starting levels of the labour force. If the starting position is in the interior of [`e; `e] then as the result of a structural shock, bargaining to a new wage will occur but there will be no change in the labour force. A change in the labour force will take place only if there is a large shock or if there are a series of small shocks that move in the economy in the same direction and, in aggregate, are equivalent to a large shock. If the shock itself is a change in the labour force then the wage bill changes by the change in the value of production -pro…ts are una¤ected by the shock (with a discount factor below unity there will be small change to pro…ts).
We have seen that pro…ts are a constant proportion of the maximum 'pie' and this pie is approximately equal to max[f (`) r`] (the approximation becomes exact when v( ) is iso-elastic). The e¤ect of a shock on this pie can be separated into a direct e¤ect and an indirect e¤ect caused by a change in pie e¢ cient labour force;
an envelope condition allows this indirect e¤ect to be ignored. It is relevant to note that shocks which lead to an increase in output (or the value of output) will bias the distribution of rewards in favour of pro…ts. Figure 4 shows that equilibrium can be attained at positions that are to the left of the contract curve and although the …rm will never choose a labour force giving rise to an equilibrium to the left of the labour demand curve, an equilibrium at such a position can be sustained after some structural shock. But given the debate concerning models which fail to incorporate 'e¢ cient'bargaining, Proposition 6 is of importance. If pie e¢ ciency and exchange e¢ ciency con ‡ict then when the …rm chooses a labour force, the resulting equilibrium will be to the right of the CC curve: the present model predicts unambiguously higher employment levels than those predicted in previous models and, in terms of exchange e¢ ciency, there will be over-employment.
Finally, we note that our analysis has relied upon the fact that wage o¤ers lie above the 'outside option' b w (but see the comment following Proposition 5). As is now well recognised, 'outside options' qua 'outside options' place a constraint on o¤ers but, other than this, do not in ‡uence the bargained outcome. The only relevance of b w is that it in part determines union preferences (Shaked and Sutton (1984b) , Binmore, Shaked and Sutton (1989) ). The distinction between the 'outside option' b w and the reservation price r is important: unlike b w, r plays a crucial role in determining the pro…ts that the …rm will receive in the bargained outcome.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has examined the non-cooperative bargaining implications of union-…rm wage negotiation. In particular, the analysis has moved away from the problem where a …xed pie is being divided and, by allowing employment as well as wage levels to be determined during the bargaining process, a variable pie has been admitted. This has forced us. to examine the di¤erent notions of exchange and pie e¢ ciency and it is of interest that the characterisation of equilibria makes use of both e¢ ciency conditions.
The introduction of the possibility of exchange ine¢ ciency has been shown to imply the optimality of behaviour which leads to the rejection of o¤ers and multiplicity of equilibria -within strict bounds -is naturally introduced.
With regard to the application to union-…rm bargaining, the model analyzed in this paper can be viewed as a situation where contracts are of short duration or where there is no commitment -the union cannot commit not to make new wage demands, the …rm cannot commit not to make new wage o¤ers or to change the labour force. Given that contracts are not written in stone for all time, the analysis casts doubt on other theories of union-…rm bargaining. Three qualitative conclusions stand out from this new theory. First, the theory predicts overemployment in unionised …rms. Second, the theory predicts that the …rm's right-to-manage is of negative value to the …rm.
In consequence, the …rm will gain from procedures which commit it to a particular labour force. In particular, unionised …rms will gain from laws that demand generous redundancy provisions and they will be encouraged to adopt methods of production involving job speci…c skills. Third, looking at the e¤ects of structural shocks, the theory provides an explanation for the rigidity of employment levels with wage/pro…t division being determined by the size of the maximal pie. An implication of this is that retiring workers usually will not be replaced and the e¢ ciency gain resulting will go in its entirety to wages rather than pro…ts.
Finally, we note how the model changes with a change in union objective. If …ring must follow a strict rule as in a seniority system with 'last-in-…rst-out', one can conduct an analysis that parallels the present analysis. The concept of pie e¢ ciency is unaltered but the exchange e¢ cient set becomes the labour demand curve above the wage b w. The best equilibrium for the …rm involves the same labour force choice as with utilitarian preferences -this is also the unique Markovian equilibrium and the commitment equilibrium. The worst equilibrium lies on the labour demand curve and this involves lower pro…ts than the worst equilibrium with utilitarian preferences.
Unlike in the utilitarian case, there will always be a range of pro…ts that the …rm can achieve so there is more opportunity for 'exotic'equilibria to occur (continuation equilibria acting as appropriate 'carrots and sticks').
The purpose of the appendix is to provide proofs of the subgame perfect equilibrium characterisation results presented in the main text. Recall that is the highest pro…t that the …rm can attain (with labour force` ) and is the lowest pro…t that the …rm may have to accept in equilibrium.
Proposition 4. The maximal pro…t that the …rm can achieve in equilibrium occurs when the labour force is chosen to ensure pie e¢ ciency and division is as in the Rubinstein problem.
Proof. We know that in equilibrium, is attained by choosing some` and agreement is reached during the …rst round of negotiation. Assume that the union has rejected the …rm's o¤er at t = 0 and consider the union's o¤er at t = 1: For the o¤er to be acceptable, the …rm must be given at most and if the continuation from t = 2 gives the …rm then the union will have to and will wish to make such an o¤er. Recalling (11),the …rm will make an acceptable o¤er at t = 0 and receive:
The other alternative is that the union does not wish to make an acceptable o¤er at t = 1 in which case the union can achieve more in a continuation than it will obtain by o¤ering . At t = 0, an acceptable o¤er by the …rm will therefore leave it with pro…ts no greater than e . Therefore, the best that the …rm can achieve occurs when the union makes an acceptable o¤er. The best o¤er is which arises with a continuation at t = 2 giving rise to . Thus
and (A1) and (A2) give:
is the Rubinstein division at` . Now assume that` does not maximize the pie and consider a labour force`which is arbitrarily close to` and gives a greater pie.
Consider an equilibrium where, starting at any labour force, the …rm always chooses and receives when it is given the opportunity. If the initial labour force is` then the union will strictly prefer to make an acceptable o¤er at t = 1. As preferences are continuous, it will wish to make an acceptable o¤er at t = 1 if the initial labour force is`: Thus, if the …rm initially chooses`then it will receive pro…ts:
As`is more pie e¢ cient than` ; < g( ;`), which follows because R (` ) and g has a slope in less than unity (recall the proof of Proposition 3). Thus:
which is a contradiction:` is pie e¢ cient and, from (A3), division is as in the Rubinstein problem.
Proposition 5. For su¢ ciently small, the in…mal pro…t that the …rm can receive in equilibrium is equal to the supremal pro…t.
Proof. Consider the worst consequences to the …rm of choosing labour force` . If the …rm's o¤er at t = 0 is unacceptable then at t = 1 the union must decide whether to make an acceptable o¤er. An o¤er will be accepted. For small, will be arbitrarily small and, through discounting, the union will prefer to o¤er the …rm this or a lower acceptable amount rather than delay agreement. Thus, the union will make an acceptable o¤er and, as this cannot be less than , the …rm at date 0 will receive pro…ts such that:
Now, as by de…nition:
But as = g( ;` ) and ; g having a slope of less than unity in gives = Proposition 6. Consider the labour force size`0 that maximises pie e¢ ciency subject to being exchange e¢ cient with pro…ts : Then as ! 1; ! R (`0) and this can be sustained by an equilibrium where the …rm chooses labour force size`0 and division is as in the Rubinstein problem.
Proof. We start by constructing an equilibrium which gives pro…ts to the …rm which are less than when`0 is not pie e¢ cient (`0 6 =` ): Let`be any more pie e¢ cient labour force size than`0 such that`6 =` and = R (`): Consider`0 0 close to`0 which is more pie e¢ cient than`0 but less pie e¢ cient than`: R (`0) < R (`0 0 ) < :
It will be shown that for close to unity there is an equilibrium -call it the E( ) equilibrium -giving the …rm pro…ts of g( ;`0 0 ) which, as`tends to`0; gives g(e ;`0)
where e = R (`0): By de…nition, this pro…t is equal to e = R (`0): [It will then be shown that is bounded below by R (`0) and the result will follow]. The equilibrium takes the following form:
1. If the …rm chooses a labour force more pie e¢ cient than`0 0 then the …rm can obtain a pro…t of if it chooses a labour force size of`0 after one round of negotiation. If it chooses some`c 6 =`0 then the continuation equilibrium is E( ) (giving at most g( ;`0 0 ) which is less than ).
2. If the …rm chooses a labour force`no more pie e¢ cient than`0 0 then the …rm can obtain a pro…t of in a continuation if it retains the labour force`; otherwise the continuation equilibrium is E( ) with some di¤erent labour force`c:
We will show …rst that the …rm can be o¤ered a continuation of at di¤erent labour force levels. For the equilibria that have been constructed, it is necessary only to show that ( ;`) can be sustained as an equilibrium for an`where R (`) < . The easiest way to do this is through a randomization device which selects equilibria as with sunspots. 8 Assume that`is chosen and randomization then takes place. With probability p, if agreement is not reached during the …rst round of negotiation then the …rm is o¤ered the supremum pro…t in all continuations (and achieves ) and, with probability 1 p, the …rm is o¤ered the E( ) equilibrium in all continuations (and achieves g( ;`0 0 )). Consider what the …rm can achieve when p = 0. If, subject to agreement not being reached at t = 0, the union wishes to make an acceptable o¤er at t = 1 then the …rm will wish to make an acceptable o¤er at t = 0 and the …rm will receive g(g( ;`0 0 );`) which is less than (as`and`0 0 are less pie e¢ cient than`). If the union does not wish to make an acceptable o¤er at t = 1 then this can only reduce the pro…t received by this …rm (as viewed at t = 0). Thus, with p = 0, the value to the …rm of choosing`falls short of : When p = 1, the …rm can wait until t = 2 and receive so the value to the …rm of choosing`is at least strictly exceeds . Thus continuity ensures that there is a p between zero and unity which gives expected pro…t to the …rm of when it chooses`. [It is possible to replace this type of mechanism with one where E( ) is o¤ered in continuations but with the knowledge that will become available at some date in the future. With close to unity, a date can be chosen to give the …rm pro…ts arbitrarily close to ].
We now return to examine the consequences of the rules that have been laid down about continuation equilibria. Given that o¤ers are optimally chosen given these rules, what labour force will be chosen by the …rm? Consider …rst the case of the …rm choosing a labour force`more pie e¢ cient than`0 0 . If agreement is not reached during the …rst round of negotiation, it is optimal for the …rm to choose`0 and obtain pro…ts . At t = 1, the union will not wish to make an acceptable o¤er if:
V ( ;`;`; 1) < V ( ;`0;`; 2)
For close to unity, this will be satis…ed if:
V ( ;`;`; t) < V ( ;`0;`; t)
which holds because`0 is exchange e¢ cient (recall equation (13)). Thus, at t = 0, the …rm will make an acceptable o¤er if:
V ( 2 ;`;`; 0) > V ( ;`0;`; 2) (A10) but this is ruled out by (A9) if is close to unity. Thus, no acceptable o¤er will be made during the …rst round of negotiation and the …rm will receive at t = 2.
Discounting back to t = 0 gives pro…ts of 2 which falls strictly short of . Now consider choosing a labour force size`which is less pie e¢ cient than`0 0 . The …rm choosing`and receiving pro…ts as a continuation is equilibrium behaviour so, at t = 1, the union will wish to make an acceptable o¤er; thus, at t = 0; the …rm will make an acceptable o¤er which gives it a pro…t of:
= g( ;`):
As > R (`) by assumption, g having a slope less than unity in gives:
> g( ;`):
We thus have:
The optimal strategy of the …rm is therefore to choose`0 0 rather than`and obtain a pro…t of .
What happens when`converges to`0? The pro…t resulting from the E( ) equilibrium converges to g( R (`0);`0); by de…nition, this is R (`0). Thus, for close to unity, (the in…mum pro…t) must be less than an equal to R (`0):
Finally, we consider a lower bound for . Consider any`such that ( ;`) is exchange e¢ cient. If the …rm chooses labour force size`then, after one round of negotiation, the continuation will be ( ;`) for some . As the union prefers ( ;`) to ( ;`) to ( ;`), discounting ensures that it will wish to make an acceptable o¤er at t = 1 with the result that, at t = 0, the …rm will achieve g( ;`): As this cannot be less than g( ;`); the …rm can always achieve at least g( ;`) which, by de…nition, must not exceed : As g has a slope of less than unity in ; R (`) and, in particular, R (`0):
